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96-1570

NYNEX CORP. v. DISCON INC.

Ruling below (CA 2, 93 F.3d 1055):
Allegation that regional telephone company conspired to pay higher price to its former subsidiary for
telephone removal services (part of which it allegedly recouped via secret rebate scheme) in order to
disadvantage former subsidiary's direct competitor in supplying of removal services states claim under
Section 1 of Sherman Act, at least under rule of reason and possibly under per se rule applied to group
boycotts in which restraint of trade has no purpose except stifling competition; allegation that regional
telephone company and its purchasing agent conspired with former subsidiary to assist latter in its
monopolization of market for removal services in order to suppress other suppliers who would bypass
purchasing agent and deal with phone company directly states claim for conspiracy to monopolize under
Section 2 of Sherman Act, even though phone company and purchasing agent do not compete in removal
services market.
Questions presented: (1) When purchaser agrees to buy from supplier A rather than supplier B, and
there is no issue of any horizontal restraints or vertical price restraints, may agreement between
purchaser and supplier A be characterized as group boycott in violation of Section 1 of Sherman Act?
(2) Assuming same facts, may agreement between purchaser and supplier A be characterized as
conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of Sherman Act?

97-53

ROBERTS v. GALEN OF VIRGINIA INC.

Ruling below (CA 6, 111 F.3d 405):
Absent evidence that doctors who discharged patient before she was stabilized acted on basis of
improper motive, hospital is not liable under Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act as
construed in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (CA6 1990), even if improper
motive, such as patient's indigency, influenced hospital's social worker who, under pressure from hospital
administrators, arranged for indigent patient's transfer to long-term care facility upon her discharge;
under applicable Kentucky law, hospital that clearly attempted to alert public that physicians on its
premises were not its employees or agents is not liable for surgical residents' negligence in discharging
patient prematurely.
Question presented: Does claim under EMTALA require proof of improper motive on part of hospital,
its staff, or physicians as prerequisite for recovery?

97-303

HUMANA INC v. FORSYTH

Ruling below (CA 9, 114 F.3d 1467):
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Although Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act prohibits acts that are also prohibited
under applicable Nevada insurance law, complaint alleging RICO violation by insurer that secretly
negotiated discount with health care provider for its portion of charges incurred by co-paying
beneficiaries does not 'invalidate, impair, or otherwise supersede' Nevada law, which, unlike RICO, does
not provide private cause of action, and thus complaint is not barred by McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Question presented: Would application of RICO to business of insurance 'invalidate, impair or
supersede' state law regulating same conduct in contravention of McCarran-Ferguson Act when state
and federal statutory prohibitions are parallel, but remedies provided are materially different?

97-475

EL AL ISRAEL AIRLINES LTD. v. TSENG

Ruling below (CA 2, 65 LW 2817):
Intrusive security search of airline passenger who is suspected of presenting possible risk of terrorism
but is later cleared is not 'accident' within meaning of Article 17 of Warsaw Convention; state law claims
to recover for injuries sustained during international air travel are not precluded by Warsaw Convention
when event or occurrence giving rise to injury is found to be outside convention.
Question presented: Does Warsaw Convention, which is U.S. treaty, exclusively govern and preclude
any recovery for passenger's injuries sustained in course of 'international transportation' if injuries were
not caused by 'accident' within meaning of Article 17 of Convention?

97-1056

MARQUEZ v. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD INC,

Ruling below (CA 9, 124 F.3d 1034, 156 LRRM 2129):
Union did not breach its duty of fair representation by negotiating collective bargaining agreement that
requires every actor employed by producer of television series to be union member, even though
decisional law limits requirement of union 'membership' to requirement that employee pay union initiation
fees and dues covering 'financial core' of services provided to all employees; actor's challenge to CBA
provision requiring union membership and payment of periodic dues and initiation fees by any actor who,
when hired by producer, had previously worked more than 30 days in motion picture industry is
preempted by National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction.
Questions presented: (1) Does union breach its duty of fair representation when it negotiates and
maintains compulsory unionism provision that, on its face, requires--misleadingly--that employee be 'a
member of the Union' and pay periodic dues and initiation fee 'uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring membership,' even though those requirements cannot lawfully be enforced literally as condition
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of employment? (2) Does NLRB have exclusive jurisdiction over performer's claim that union breached
its duty of fair representation by negotiating and maintaining compulsory unionism provision that
misleadingly requires payment of dues as condition of employment after 30 days of 'employment as a
performer in the motion picture industry'? (3) If NLRB does not have exclusive jurisdiction over this
claim, did union breach its duty of fair representation by negotiating and maintaining that provision? (4)
Is employer indispensable party to suit for breach of duty of fair representation when employee seeks
reformation or expungement of CBA provision alleged to be facially invalid?

97-1130

PFAFF v. WELLS ELECTRONICS INC.

Ruling below (CA FC, 124 F.3d 1429, 43 USPQ2d 1928):
Claims of patent directed to sockets for testing leadless chip carriers are invalid under 35 USC 102(b),
on ground that invention of claims was on sale more than one year prior to application date, even though
invention had not been reduced to practice in physical embodiment at time of sale; evidence establishes
that inventor was confident that invention would work for its intended purpose at time of sale and that
invention was substantially complete at least by time of pre-critical date offer to sell and receipt of
purchase order, circumstances clearly indicate that more than mere concept was on sale, and, although
invention was not fatigue tested until after critical date, durability is not claimed or inherent aspect of
invention, making demonstration of durability unnecessary for substantial completion of invention.
Question presented: In view of longstanding statutory definition that one- year grace period to 'on sale'
bar can start to run only after invention is fully completed, should patent have been held invalid under
35 USC 102(b) when invention was admittedly not 'fully completed' more than one year before patent
application was filed?

97-1139

U.S. v. RODRIGUEZ-MORENO

Ruling below (U.S. v. Palma-Ruedas, CA 3, 121 F.3d 841, 61 CrL 1420):
Proper venue for trying charge of using or carrying firearm in crime of violence, in violation of 19 USC
924(c), is place where firearm was actually used or carried, regardless of whether venue for predicate
crime could properly lie in another jurisdiction.
Question presented: Is venue in prosecution for using or carrying firearm during and in relation to
crime of violence, under Section 924(c)(1), proper in any district in which defendant committed
underlying crime of violence, even if defendant did not use or carry firearm in that district?
97-1184

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1309 v. DEPT.
436

OF INTERIOR
Ruling below (Dept. of Interior v. FLRA, CA 4, 66 LW 1285):
Federal Services Labor-Management Relations Act bars Federal Labor Relations Authority from
requiring federal agency to bargain collectively over whether to engage, under next contract, in midterm
bargaining over union-initiated proposals.
Questions presented: (1) Does Federal Services Labor-Management Relations Act obligate agency to
bargain over union-initiated midterm proposals, when subject matter of proposals is not covered by term
agreement, and union has not waived its right to bargain? (2) Does statute require agency to bargain over
contract provision that would obligate it to engage in negotiations, during term of agreement, over
union-initiated proposals?

97-1230

WEST COVINA, CALIF. v. PERKINS

Ruling below (CA 9, 113 F.3d 1004):
Notice provided to owner of property seized outside scope of search warrant, which stated that home
had been searched and gave date of search warrant, name of issuing judge and court, date of search, list
of property seized, and names and telephone numbers of police officers to contact for 'more information'
was 'skeletal,' and, like notice given in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978),
was insufficient to satisfy demands of due process; application of interest-balancing test set out in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), leads to conclusion that in cases in which property is taken
under California law, notice must inform owner of procedure for contesting seizure or retention of
property along with any additional information required for initiating that procedure in appropriate court;
notice must also include warrant number or, if it is not available and record is sealed, means of
identifying court file, and must explain need for written motion or request to court stating why property
should be returned; district court is instructed to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on his due
process claims.
Questions presented: (1) Does procedural component of Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
require police department to provide legal advice and guidance concerning how to pursue
post-deprivation judicial remedies for return of property seized during execution of search warrant? (2)
Should balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge be used by federal courts to expand procedural
rights in context of post-deprivation remedies?

97-1235

MONTEREY, CALIF. v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY LTD.

Ruling below (CA 9, 95 F.3d 1422):
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Landowner's 42 USC 1983 inverse condemnation action against city arising out of city's denial of
application for residential development of 37.6 ocean- front acres is in nature of action at law triable to
jury; issues of whether landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of property by
regulatory denial and whether city's actions substantially advanced legitimate public purpose, though
presenting mixed questions of law and fact, are essentially fact-bound issues that may be presented to
jury; city produced insufficient evidence of adverse environmental impacts and inadequacy of public
access to property to warrant judgment notwithstanding jury verdict in favor of landowner.
Questions presented: (1) In regulatory taking action challenging local land use decision, does 42 USC
1983 require that all liability issues be determined by court rather than by jury? (2) Can liability for
regulatory taking be based upon standard that allows jury or court to reweigh evidence concerning
reasonableness of public agency's land use decision? (3) Can reasonable proportionality standard
established by Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 62 LW 4576 (1994), in context of property
exactions properly be applied to inverse condemnation claim based upon regulatory denial?

97-1243

FEDERAL LABOR RELA TIONS A UTHORITY v. DEPT. OF INTERIOR

Ruling below (CA 4, 132 F.3d 157, 66 LW 1285):
Federal Services Labor-Management Relations Act bars Federal Labor Relations Authority from
requiring federal agency to bargain collectively over whether to engage, under next contract, in midterm
bargaining over union-initiated proposals.
Question presented: Does duty to bargain over matters that are not inconsistent with federal law or
government-wide regulation require agency employer to bargain over proposal that would create
contractual obligation to negotiate over union-initiated proposals offered during term of collective
bargaining agreement?

97-1287

HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. JACOBSON

Ruling below (CA 9, 105 F.3d 1288, 65 LW 2498, 20 EBC 2393):
Retirees' allegations that employer used pension plan surplus assets created in part by employee
contributions for its own benefit and for benefit of employees who were never participants in such plan
to establish new non-contributory retirement plan state cognizable claims under anti-inurement, fiduciary
duty, and non-forfeiture provisions of Employee Retirement Income Security Act; holding in Lockheed
Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 64 LW 4430 (1996), that amending existing pension plan to use surplus
assets to fund early retirement program for participants of plan does not violate ERISA, so long as other
ERISA provisions are not violated, is distinguishable, in part on basis that surplus in Lockheed was
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attributable solely to employer contributions and that early retirement program in Lockheed benefited
only those employees who were already participants in existing plan; only after discovery can district
court properly determine whether employer's conduct in freezing enrollment in existing, contributory
plan when it created new, non-contributory plan for new employees without equitably distributing
surplus attributable to employee contributions amounted to constructive termination of contributory plan
under common law of trusts.
Questions presented: (1) Did Ninth Circuit err by refusing to follow holding in Lockheed Corp. v.
Spink that 'the act of amending a pension plan does not trigger ERISA's fiduciary provisions'? (2) Did
Ninth Circuit err by limiting Spink to plans funded only by employer contributions, even though that
limitation is never mentioned in Spink opinion, has no basis in law or logic, and has been rejected by
other circuits? (3) Did Ninth Circuit err by concluding, contrary to three other circuits, that participants
in defined benefit plan have legally cognizable property interest not only in their defined benefits but also
in assets held by plan? (4) Did Ninth Circuit err by holding, contrary to three other circuits, that ERISA
plan may be forcibly terminated (and its assets distributed) by means not specified in ERISA's exclusive
termination provisions?

97-1337

MINNESOTA v. MILLE LACS BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS

Ruling below (CA 8, 124 F.3d 904):
1850 executive order that (i) explicitly revoked rights conferred on Indian bands by 1837 treaty to hunt
and fish 'during the pleasure of the President' on land ceded by Indians to United States and (ii) required
removal of Indians remaining on ceded lands was ineffectual to revoke rights to hunt and fish because
order's removal provision, from which provision revoking rights to hunt and fish is not severable, did not
comply with congressional requirements and was thus unauthorized; nor were 1837 treaty rights to hunt
and fish revoked by 1855 treaty that established reservation within land ceded by 1837 treaty and,
without mentioning hunting and fishing rights, conveyed to United States 'all right, title, and interest .
. . in and to any other lands,' because neither Indians nor United States intended to revoke such rights
in 1855 treaty; different ruling is not mandated by Oregon Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian
Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985), in which hunting and fishing rights were exclusive, on-reservation rights that
were held to be extinguished on that part of reservation that was relinquished by later treaty; equal
footing doctrine, which requires that all states admitted to union after original 13 states be admitted with
same rights and sovereignty as original states, does not require conclusion that Indians' 1837 treaty rights
to hunt and fish were extinguished by congressional silence regarding such rights upon Minnesota's
admission in 1858.
Questions presented: (1) Does treaty provision that gives Indian bands right to hunt and fish 'during
the pleasure of the President' create only temporary rights that are extinguished when state is admitted
to Union on equal footing with original 13 states? (2) Does treaty ceding to United States 'all right, title
and interest of whatsoever nature' in previously ceded territory constitute express abrogation of hunting
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and fishing rights reserved in previous treaty under this court's holding in Oregon Dep't of Fish and
Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe? (3) Did president act within scope of his congressional authority when
he revoked Indians' right to hunt and fish under treaty that guaranteed only those rights 'during the
pleasure of the President of the United States'?

97-1396

LOPEZ v. MONTEREY COUNTY, CALIF

Ruling below (DC NCalif, 12/19/97):
Although county whose ordinances merging several inferior court district into single, countywide
municipal court district served by judges elected by county residents at large is jurisdiction subject to
preclearance requirements of Section 5 of Voting Rights Act with respect to changes in its electoral
practices, subsequent changes in laws of state, which is not covered jurisdiction, that converted county's
judicial election scheme into state plan render Section 5 inapplicable.
Question presented: May Section 5-covered jurisdiction implement voting changes without
preclearance--when changes were initially created by county ordinances that this court already has
determined to be subject to Section 5--simply because state, uncovered jurisdiction, subsequently enacts
legislation that incorporates county's prior changes?

97-1418
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASS'N v. 203 NORTH
LASALLE STREET PARTNERSHIP
Ruling below (CA 7, 126 F.3d 955, 66 LW 1238):
In codifying absolute priority rule upon enactment of Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC 1 129(b)(2)(B)(ii),
Congress did not abandon rule's longstanding, judicially created, 'new value' corollary, which permits
junior claim holder, including equity interest holder, to retain equity interest in property over objection
of senior impaired creditor class in exchange for contributing new capital to restructured enterprise.
Question presented: Does Bankruptcy Code authorize judge to confirm Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization that grants pre-bankruptcy equity owners of debtor exclusive opportunity to retain or
purchase ownership interest in reorganized debtor, but does not provide for full payment to senior,
objecting class of unsecured creditors?

97-1472

HADDLE v. GARRISON

Ruling below (CA 11, 12/5/97):
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Court affirms district court decision that, because former at-will employee had no constitutionally
protected interest in continued employment, his allegation that he was discharged in attempt to deter his
participation as witness in federal criminal trial did not state claim under 42 USC 1985(2), which creates
private cause of action for injuries when two or more persons conspire to deter any party or witness from
appearing in court or testifying, or conspire to injure anyone who has appeared or testified.
Question presented: Is loss of'at will' employment compensable in damages
under 42 USC 1985(2)?

97-1489

YOUR HOME VISITING NURSE SERVICES INC. v. SHALALA

Ruling below (CA 6, 132 F.3d 1135):
Provision of Department of Health and Human Services' Provider Reimbursement Manual that bars
appeal to Provider Reimbursement Review Board of fiscal intermediary's decision not to reopen
Medicare provider's cost reports is not foreclosed by plain language of Medicare statute, is
reasonable interpretation of statute, and is thus entitled to deference.
Questions presented: (1) Is there jurisdiction for review of refusal to reopen Medicare provider's cost
report under 42 USC 1395oo, 28 USC 1331, 28 USC 1361, and 5 USC 706? (2) Is 42 CFR 405.1885(c)
based on permissible construction of Medicare statute?

97-1536

ARIZ. DEPT OF REVENUE v. BLAZE CONSTRUCTION CO.

Ruling below (Ariz CtApp Divl, 190 Ariz. 262, 947 P.2d 836):
Arizona's assessment of transaction privilege (contracting) taxes against construction company's gross
proceeds from building federally funded roads for U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs on Indian reservations
within Arizona, which provided no regulatory or other services related to improving, maintaining, or
using any such reservation roads, interferes with on-reservation road building and improvement activities
that are governed by comprehensive federal regulations and is thus impliedly preempted by federal law,
notwithstanding state's contention that Indian law preemption analysis does not apply because contracts
were let by BIA rather than by tribes and because Congress has neither expressly nor impliedly indicated
intent to preempt state taxation of federal contractors on Indian reservations.
Question presented: Is state tax on contractor doing business with United States on Indian reservation
preempted when Congress has not expressly provided for such preemption and there is no infringement
on tribal sovereignty because no tribal funds are used and no tribe is party to contract?
97-7213

MOSLEYv. U.S.
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Ruling below (CA 3, 126 F.3d 200, 62 CrL 1018):
Crime of bank larceny, as defined in 18 USC 2113(b), includes element of'intent to steal or purloin'
that is omitted from definition of'bank robbery' in 18 USC 2113(a), in which robber's subjective
intent
to steal, i.e., to permanently deprive rightful owner of property, is irrelevant to crime of resort to force
and violence or intimidation in presence of another to accomplish robber's purposes, and thus
district
court properly denied defendant's request for instruction that bank larceny is lesser included offense
of
bank robbery.
Question presented: Is bank larceny, in violation of 18 USC 2113(b), lesser included offense
of bank
robbery in violation of 18 USC 2113(a), as matter of law, pursuant to textual 'elements'
adopted by U.S.
Supreme Court in Schmuck v. U.S., 489 U.S. 705 (1989)?
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